PROTECT AMERICA BY BEING
UNIQUE: HOW CHANGES IN
BIOMETRIC DATA COLLECTION
PROCEDURES CAN IMPROVE US-VISIT
INTRODUCTION
Since 2004, the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) has
used biometric data technology to identify virtually all foreign citizens
entering the United States.1 United States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology, 2 commonly referred to as “US-VISIT,”
utilizes fingerprint scanning and facial photographs to confirm the
identities of foreign visitors between the ages of 14 and 79. 3 Demonstrating the magnitude of the program, US-VISIT identifies about
30,000 individuals for the U.S. Department of State and 100,000 individuals for U.S. Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”) each day. 4
As this note will discuss, US-VISIT has achieved considerable
success in using biometric identification technology to meet U.S. security objectives, 5 but falls short of its full potential. 6 While DHS has
1

See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-1044T, HOMELAND
SECURITY: PROSPECTS FOR BIOMETRIC US-VISIT EXIT CAPABILITY REMAIN UNCLEAR
4 (2007); U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., UNITED STATES IS COLLECTING 10
FINGERPRINTS FROM INTERNATIONAL TRAVELERS AT MAJOR U.S. PORTS OF ENTRY 1
(2009), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/usvisit/usvisit_edu_10fingerprint_consumer_friendly_content_250_words.pdf.
2
See U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., US-VISIT, BIOMETRICS AND YOU 1
(2007), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/usvisit/usvisit_edu_traveler_
brochure_printer_friendly_english.pdf [hereinafter BIOMETRICS AND YOU] (describing
the US-VISIT procedure and providing information about its applicability).
3
U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., CURRENT U.S. BIOMETRIC EXIT
PROCEDURES FOR INTERNATIONAL VISITORS AT AIRPORTS AND SEAPORTS1 (2008),
available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/usvisit/usvisit_edu_airsea_biometric_
Exit_Update.pdf [hereinafter CURRENT U.S. BIOMETRIC EXIT PROCEDURES].
4
U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., ENHANCING SECURITY THROUGH
BIOMETRIC IDENTIFICATION 5 (2008), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary
/assets/usvisit/usvisit_edu_biometrics_brochure_english.pdf [hereinafter ENHANCING
SECURITY THROUGH BIOMETRIC IDENTIFICATION].
5
See id. at 2 (providing specific examples of the use of biometric data to
uncover true identity and criminal history of travelers through U.S. ports of entry).
6
See e.g., DIEM NGUYEN & JENA BAKER MCNEILL, HERITAGE FOUND.,
BIOMETRIC EXIT PROGRAM SHOWS NEED FOR NEW STRATEGY TO REDUCE VISA
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implemented effective procedures to capture the biometric data of
those entering the country, it has not yet executed a plan to collect the
biometric data of those leaving it. 7 If biometric exit-data were collected, immigration officials could instantly identify those aliens still present in the United States in violation of the terms of their visas.8
Realizing the benefits of collecting this information, Congress
mandated in 2007 that DHS develop a system to collect biometric
exit-data by June of 2009, 9 but doing so has proven problematic. 10
Indeed, DHS notes that the infrastructure, land, and resources necessary to construct a collection system at the country’s points of exit that
mirror those at the points of entry are impracticable.11 According to
the Heritage Foundation, exit collection systems could cost DHS between $3.1 billion and $6.4 billion over the next ten years. 12 To put
this cost in perspective, DHS has spent only $1.3 billion on the implementation of an entry-data collection system. In light of these staggering costs, some have even questioned the value of obtaining biometric exit-data. 13
Yet, are there alternative solutions that would allow for the collection of exit-data without requiring DHS to absorb this unreasonable
expense? This Note advocates for increased security cooperation with
border countries such as Canada. In so doing, significant cost savings
could be realized if the United States were to take advantage of the
infrastructure already in place at the respective borders. Additionally,
this Note reviews biometric technologies already employed at the
borders of foreign countries that could be adopted by the United
States to mitigate some of the impracticability cited by DHS.
Part I of this note will examine the current implementation of biometric identification technologies used by immigration officials in
OVERSTAYS (2010), available at http://s3.amazonaws.com/thf_media/2010/pdf/bg_
2358.pdf.
7
BIOMETRICS AND YOU, supra note 2, at 3; see generally NGUYEN &
MCNEILL, supra note 6 (providing background information about proposed exit programs).
8
See NGUYEN &MCNEILL, supra note 6, at 2.
9
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No.
108-458, § 2845, 118 stat. 3638, 3729 (2004).
10
See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-248, BORDER
SECURITY: US-VISIT FACES STRATEGIC, OPERATIONAL, AND TECHNOLOGICAL
CHALLENGES AT LAND PORTS OF ENTRY 7 (2006); NGUYEN & MCNEILL, supra note 6,
at 2-5.
11
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-248, BORDER SECURITY:
US-VISIT FACES STRATEGIC, OPERATIONAL, AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHALLENGES AT
LAND PORTS OF ENTRY 7 (2006).
12
NGUYEN & MCNEILL, supra note 6, at 4.
13
Id.
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the United States. Part II will identify and discuss possible programs
with Canada that could mitigate the costs associated with the implementation of an exit-data collection system. It will also identify technological advances and future collection procedures that could improve the success of the program.

I. U.S. IMMIGRATION’S IMPLEMENTATION OF
BIOMETRIC IDENTIFICATION TECHNOLOGY
A. History of Federal Legislation Calling for Biometric Data
Collection
In an attempt to “strengthen and tighten the immigration law” and
“improve border control,” 14 the U.S. Congress passed the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (“IIRIRA”) in
1996. 15 IIRIRA required U.S. immigration officials to implement an
“automated entry and exit control system” to “collect a record of departure for every alien…and match the records of departure with the
record of the alien’s arrival in the United States….”16 In response to
this legislation, Immigration and Naturalization Services (“Legacy
INS”) 17 created the National Automated Immigration Lookout System
(“NAILS”). 18

14
Laurence M. Krutchik, Down But Not Out: A Comparison of Previous
Attempts at Immigration Reform and the Resulting Agency Implemented Changes, 32
NOVA L. REV. 455, 463 (2008) (quoting 3A AM. JUR. 2D Aliens and Citizens § 5
(2005)).
15
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996,
Pub.L. No. 140-208, div. C, 110 Stat. 3009-558 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 and 18 U.S.C.).
16
Id. at §110.
17
Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”) was originally part of the
U.S. Department of Justice and handled legal and illegal immigration and naturalization. Following the events of September 11, 2001, the U.S. Congress ordered the
reorganization of federal agencies responsible for securing U.S. borders and centralized their management in the newly formed Department of Homeland Security
(“DHS”). There are now four primary federal agencies within DHS that provide border security. Customs and Border Patrol (“CBP”) patrols the U.S. border and conducts immigrations and customs inspections. The Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) investigates immigrations and customs violations within
the United States. The Transportation Security Administration (“TSA”) is responsible
for the security of the country’s land, rail, and air transportation networks. The U.S.
Coast Guard (“USCG”) continues to provide maritime and port security. See BLAS
NUÑEZ-NETO, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS21899, BORDER SECURITY: KEY AGENCIES
AND THEIR MISSIONS 1 (2005). See generally NAT’L COMM’N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS
UPON THE U.S., THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT (2004), available at
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/report/911Report.pdf [hereinafter THE 9/11
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Legacy INS, in conjunction with the State Department and customs authorities, used NAILS to identify and screen all foreigners
seeking entry into the United States. 19 The system relied on a database
containing biographical information for individuals which could be
cross-referenced during visa application review procedures and at
immigration points of entry. 20 Unfortunately, foreign travelers could
evade NAILS identity detection easily by using false names and
fraudulent documentation. 21
After the events of September 11, 2001, Congressional leaders
became increasingly critical of the biographical nature of the NAILS
database because of the ease with which foreigners could bypass detection. 22 To address these deficiencies, the Congress passed a number
of national security initiatives, including the Intelligence Reform and
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. 23 Its purpose was to “attack document fraud which aids terrorists in entering the United States.” 24 A
key component of this legislation was the requirement that the newlycreated DHS incorporate biometric identification technology into the
immigration process and form an integrated system to track entry and
exit-data for foreign visitors. 25
To comply with the new biometric requirement, DHS created the
National Security Entry-Exit Registration System (“NSEERS”). 26
NSEERS required foreign visitors from 23 targeted countries, 27 as
COMMISSION REPORT] (providing background information on the need for reorganization).
18
Susan Martin & Philip Martin, International Migration and Terrorism:
Prevention, Prosecution and Protection, 18 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 329, 332 (2004).
19
Id.
20
Id.
21
Id.
22
Id. (“[NAILS] is effective only if an applicant uses a name that has been
entered into the database; false names, supported by fraudulent documentation, can
help an individual to evade identification….”).
23
See Krutchik, supra note 14, at 465 (discussing the legislative response to
9/11).
24
Id. at 465-66.
25
See Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L.
No. 108-458, § 7208(d), 118 Stat. 3638, 3819 (2004) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1365b(d)
(2006)).
26
See Press Release, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Fact Sheet: Changes to National Security Entry/Exit Registration System (NSEERS) (Dec. 01, 2003), available
at http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/press_release_0305.shtm (providing background information regarding the creation and implementation of NSEERS by DHS).
27
Targeted countries included: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Egypt, Eritrea,
Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, North Korea, Oman,
Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates,
and Yemen. DAVID S. ORTIZ ET AL., REVISITING US-VISIT: U.S. IMMIGRATION
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well as travelers DHS identified as “being of interest,” to submit to
questioning and biometric registration upon entry to the United
States. 28 Questions asked during the interviews included the individual’s email address, details about personal contacts and family members, bank accounts, credit card numbers, employer addresses, and
school addresses. 29 Upon learning of the countries to be targeted,
commentators noted that the program “patently target[ed] Muslims
and Arabs in America.” 30
Compounding concerns of racial profiling, NSEERS also included
a special “call-in registration” component.31 This aspect of the program called for all travelers from 25 countries that entered the United
States on a temporary visa to report to a DHS facility for biometric
registration. 32 International human rights groups described this retroactive special registration as discriminatory and violations of international law, as specific populations of immigrants were targeted including, for example, Pakistanis, Saudi Arabians, Bangladeshis and Egyptians. 33 While NSEERS stirred political controversy in Congress and
resulted in mass protests by ethnic groups and civil liberties advocates, 34 it resulted in the federal government’s first attempts to incorporate biometric information into the immigration process by requiring fingerprints and photographs of those registered under the program.
Fingerprint identification technology analyzes the patterns of minute ridges and furrows of skin present on the fingers and toes of hu-

PROCESSES,
CONCERNS,
AND
CONSEQUENCES
14
(2006),
available
athttp://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/2006/RAND_OP140.pdf
28
ABA Immigration and Nationality Comm., The Canada-U.S. Border:
Balancing Trade, Security and Migrant Rights in the Post 9/11 Era, 19 GEO. IMMIGR.
L.J. 199, 230 (2004). As explained by the Department of Justice, individuals were
selected for NSEERS registration “according to four criteria: (1) all citizens or nationals of certain designated countries, (2) individual notification through a tracking
database known as the ‘Interagency Border Inspection System’ (IBIS), (3) preexisting criteria defined by the Attorney General, and (4) officer discretion.” Kareem
Shora, National Security Entry Exit Registration System (NSEERS), 2 CARDOZO PUB.
L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 73, 75 (2003).
29
Id. at 75-76.
30
Id. at 74.
31
See id. (suggesting that certain ethnicities were unfairly targeted by the
“call in registration” requirements of NSEERS).
32
ABA Immigration and Nationality Comm., supra note 28, at 230.
33
See id. at 236-37.
34
See Shora, supra note 28, at 77-78 (describing, for example, a demonstration in Los Angeles that brought out 1,000 protestors in opposition to the “call-in”
registration).
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mans. 35 It is one of the most reliable techniques available to immigration enforcement officials for one simple fact: no person has ever been
found to possess the same pattern of ridges and furrows as another. 36
Furthermore, the unique characteristics of an individual’s fingerprints
do not change with time. 37
While other biometric identification techniques exist, fingerprint
technology is unique in that immigration officials already have a large
database of records upon which they may draw. 38 The United States
Government Accountability Office notes that fingerprint technology is
the optimal biometric identification technology because it can leverage existing DHS and Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) identification databases.39 The FBI has pooled and archived the fingerprint
records from U.S. law enforcement agencies since the1920s, 40 and its
Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System is now the
largest biometric database in the world, with over 400 million prints.41
DHS later expanded NSEERS to include biometric registration of
all foreign visitors to the United States. By expanding the program to
all foreigners, NSEERS no longer targeted certain ethnicities or geographic regions to the behest of many human rights organizations.
This comprehensive program developed into what is now USVISIT, 42 which is led by a director, who reports to the Deputy Secretary for Homeland Security. 43 The program office is generally respon-

35
See ADVANCES IN FINGERPRINT TECHNOLOGY 2 (Henry C. Lee & R. E.
Gaensslen eds., 2d ed. 2001).
36
Id. at 3.
37
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-03-174, TECHNOLOGY
ASSESSMENT: USING BIOMETRICS FOR BORDER SECURITY 139 (2002) (“Scientific studies in the mid-1800s established the persistence of friction ridge patterns on human
fingers, beginning in the embryonic stage and extending throughout life, except for
accidental damage.”).
38
See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-361, HOMELAND
SECURITY: STRATEGIC SOLUTION FOR US-VISIT PROGRAM NEEDS TO BE BETTER
DEFINED, JUSTIFIED, AND COORDINATED 31 (2008) (discussing the various fingerprint
databases upon which the US-VISIT program may draw).
39
Id.
40
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, THE SCIENCE OF
FINGERPRINTS: CLASSIFICATION AND USES 1 (1979).
41
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-03-174, TECHNOLOGY
ASSESSMENT: USING BIOMETRICS FOR BORDER SECURITY 139 (2002).
42
See Martin, supra note 18, at 335 (providing background information
about the creation of US-VISIT).
43
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-248, BORDER SECURITY:
US-VISIT FACES STRATEGIC, OPERATIONAL, AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHALLENGES AT
LAND PORTS OF ENTRY 12 (2006).
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sible for the “acquisition, deployment, operation, and sustainment of
US-VISIT.” 44
B. The Current US-VISIT Biometric Data Collection Process
Most foreign visitors between the ages of 14 and 79 follow USVISIT immigration procedures when travelling to the United States. 45
US-VISIT and the immigration process include three distinct stages:
(1) pre-travel visa issuance where required, (2) biometric data collection upon the traveler’s entry to the United States, and (3) biographic
data collection upon the traveler’s departure from the United States. 46
1. Pre-Travel Visa Issuance Process
The United States does not generally require a visa for travelers
from27 countries 47 participating in its Visa Waiver Program. 48 Travelers from other countries, however, must obtain a visa to enter the
country. 49 A visa permits the visitor to travel to U.S. points of entry,
such as airports, seaports and land border crossings, and request entry
to the country. 50 However, the United States maintains the right to
refuse entry to the country even if the traveler has a visa. 51 To obtain a
visa, travelers must visit a U.S. consular office or embassy before
44

Id.
U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., CURRENT U.S. BIOMETRIC EXIT
PROCEDURES FOR INTERNATIONAL VISITORS AT AIRPORTS AND SEAPORTS 1 (2008),
available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/usvisit/usvisit_edu_airsea_biometric
_Exit_Update.pdf.
46
See, e.g., BIOMETRICS AND YOU, supra note 2, at 1-3.
47
Participating countries include Andorra, Austria, Australia, Belgium,
Brunei, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Monaco, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, San
Marino, Singapore, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.
U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., VISA WAIVER PROGRAM: TRAVELER GUIDE 2 n.1
(2006), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/usvisit/usvisit_edu_traveler_
guide_english.pdf.
48
Id. at 2.A visa is still required for travelers from Visa Waiver Program
countries if the traveler “intend[s] to stay longer than 90 days, intend[s] to travel to
the United States for a reason other than business or tourism, ha[s] ever been arrested
even if not convicted, ha[s] a criminal record, ha[s] a serious, communicable disease
(including HIV), ha[s] been refused entry to the United States on a previous occasion,
ha[s] been deported from the United States, ha[s] previously overstayed the 90 days
[on a previous trip to the United States], or [is] a child included on [a] parent’s passport.”Id. at n.2.
49
Id. at 2.
50
Id.
51
See id. (“A visa allows you to travel to the United States as far as the port
of entry (airport, seaport or land border crossing), where the Customs and Border
Protection (CBP) officer has the authority to permit you to enter the United States.”).
45
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arriving in the United States. 52 There, a representative from the U.S.
Department of State reviews the traveler’s visa application53 and collects the traveler’s biometric data, including a ten-finger fingerprint
scan and a digital photograph. 54 The biometric data is then saved and
cross-referenced with all other entries in the US-VISIT database. 55
2. Data Collection Upon Entry to the United States
When travelling to the United States by ship or airplane, an airline
or cruise representative provides the traveler with an entry form that
must be completed prior to arrival. 56 Travelers from countries in the
United States’ Visa Waiver Program complete a Form I-94W, while
travelers from other countries complete a Form I-94. 57 Upon disembarking from the airplane or ship, a CBP officer interviews the traveler and reviews the requisite travel documentation as well as the I-94
or I-94W form. 58 The CBP officer scans all ten of the traveler’s fingerprints using the US-VISIT’s inkless fingerprinting technology and
takes a digital photograph of the traveler’s face. 59 US-VISIT saves the
biometric data and cross-references it against other entries in its database, including the fingerprint data taken during the visa application
interview. 60 In the event that the database matches the scan to the correct visa application, the CBP officer will permit the traveler to enter
the country. 61
Land border crossings follow modified protocols depending on
the border location and citizenship of those seeking entry. 62 At the
52
See BIOMETRICS AND YOU, supra note 2, at 1 (directing travelers to contact
the “closest U.S. visa-issuing post”).
53
Id. In addition to the visa application, foreign travelers may also have to
submit certain forms and supporting documents. See generally U.S. DEP’T OF STATE,
TYPES OF VISAS FOR TEMPORARY VISITORS, http://travel.state.gov/visa/temp/types/
types_1286.html# (last visited Mar. 5, 2011).
54
BIOMETRICS AND YOU, supra note 2, at 1.
55
Aaron S. Miller, The 2004 European Union Members and the Visa Waiver
Program: Considering Free Trade and National Security, 28 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L.
187, 206 (2007).
56
BIOMETRICS AND YOU, supra note 2, at 2.
57
Id.
58
Id.
59
Id.
60
Miller, supra note 55, at 206 (describing how CBP officers cross-reference
fingerprints in an effort to reveal possible “red flags” before the traveler enters the
United States).
61
BIOMETRICS AND YOU 2, supra note 2,at 2.
62
See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., US-VISIT AT THE U.S.-MEXICO
LAND BORDER, available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/usvisit/usvisit_edu_us
_mexico_land_border_info_card_english.pdf (last visited Mar. 5, 2011) [hereinafter
U.S.-MEXICO LAND BORDER]; U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., US-VISIT AT THE U.S.-
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Mexico-U.S. border, all travelers who are not citizens of Mexico or
the United States must follow the same process as travelers arriving at
airports and seaports. 63 Foreign travelers must complete a Form I-94
as well as have their biometric data recorded per US-VISIT protocol. 64 Mexican citizens who plan to stay in the United States more
than thirty days or who are travelling away from the border also follow these requirements. 65 Mexican citizens who plan to stay less than
thirty days and who plan to remain in the “border zone,”66 however,
may be issued a Border Crossing Card. 67 This card allows them to
cross the border without completing a Form I-94 or having to provide
biometric data for the US-VISIT program. 68 On the other hand, at the
Canada-U.S. border, most Canadians are exempt from the US-VISIT
program. 69 All other travelers who are not Canadian or United States
citizens must submit to US-VISIT data collection procedures at the
border. 70
3. Data Collection Upon Departure from the United States
When departing from the United States by airplane or ship, travelers must return their I-94 or I-94W form to the appropriate airline or
ship representative, which completes the immigration process.71 Congress mandated that DHS implement a nationwide system for collecting biometric exit-data for departing travelers by 2009, 72 but such a
CANADA BORDER, available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/usvisit/usvisit
_edu_us_canada_land_border_info_card_english.pdf (last visited Mar. 5, 2011) [hereinafter U.S.-CANADA BORDER].
63
U.S.-MEXICO LAND BORDER, supra note 62.
64
Id.
65
Id.
66
DHS defines the “border zone” as any area within 25 miles of the U.S.Mexico border in Texas, California, and New Mexico, and within 75 miles of the
U.S.-Mexico border in Arizona. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., USVISIT Fact Sheet: U.S. Land Borders (Mar. 11, 2004), available at
http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/press_release_0371.shtm.
67
U.S.-MEXICO LAND BORDER, supra note 62.
68
Id. However, if the traveler uses a Border Crossing Card and the immigration official asks for a secondary inspection, that traveler becomes subject to USVISIT’s requirements. Id.
69
U.S.-CANADA BORDER, supra note 62. Canadians are subject to the USVISIT program, however, if they are: (1) dual-citizens and are travelling under their
non-Canadian passport, or (2) using a U.S. treaty trader (E) or a fiancé (K) nonimmigrant visa. Id.
70
Id. (“US-VISIT currently applies to most visitors (with limited exemptions) entering the United States, regardless of country of origin or whether they are
traveling on a visa.”).
71
BIOMETRICS AND YOU, supra note 2, at 3.
72
CURRENT U.S. BIOMETRIC EXIT PROCEDURES, supra note 3, at3.
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process has not yet been executed.73 Creating an exit-data collection
system is challenging because most United States “airports, railway
stations, and border posts do not have physical space allocated for
exit-control activities.” 74 Thus, the cost and space necessary to implement this kind of infrastructure makes exit-data collection impracticable in many locations.75
Nevertheless, two biometric exit-data collection pilot programs
were commenced in May of 2009. 76 Specifically, U.S. Transportation
Security Administration (“TSA”) officers began collecting biometric
exit-data from non-citizens at security checkpoints at Atlanta’s
Hartsfeld-Jackson Atlanta International Airport. 77 Customs and Border Protection officials performed similar procedures at Detroit’s
Wayne County Airport. 78 The intent was that these pilot programs
would allow for the development of nationwide biometric exit-data
collection procedures. 79 As noted by DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano
during the testing, “[t]he pilot programs in Atlanta and Detroit will
help [the United States to] determine and develop standard procedures
for use at airports across the country to expedite legitimate travel and
enhance our nation’s security.” 80 During these pilot programs, TSA
agents still collected departure Forms I-94 and I-94W. 81 Following the
pilot program, US-VISIT installed exit-data collection kiosks in thirteen airports and three seaports. 82 The kiosks are located in a secure
part of the airport and are monitored by U.S. immigration officials. 83
73

BIOMETRICS AND YOU, supra note 2, at 3.
ORTIZ, supra note 27, at 13.
75
Id.
76
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., DHS Begins Test of Biometric Exit Procedures at Two U.S. Airports (May 28, 2009), available
athttp://www.dhs.gov/ynews/releases/pr_1243605893203.shtm.
77
Id.
78
Id.
79
Id. CBP and TSA used different techniques for identifying which passengers required biometric scanning. CBP used temporary signs at the gate directing
visitors to collection points. TSA checked boarding passes and directed non-U.S.
travelers to a secondary inspection zone. The pilots were designed to identify the most
accurate protocol for exit-data collection. See U.S. DEP’T. OF HOMELAND SEC.,
PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR THE UNITED STATES VISITOR AND IMMIGRANT
STATUS INDICATOR TECHNOLOGY (US-VISIT) PROGRAM, COMPREHENSIVE EXIT
PROGRAM: AIR EXIT PILOT 4 (2009), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/
privacy/privacy_pia_usvisit_air_exit.pdf
80
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., DHS Begins Test of Biometric Exit Procedures at Two U.S. Airports (May 28, 2009), available athttp://www.
dhs.gov/ynews/releases/pr_1243605893203.shtm.
81
Id.
82
US-VISIT installed biometric collection kiosks at airports in Baltimore,
Dallas, Chicago, Denver, Detroit, Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood, Atlanta, Newark,
74
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The U.S. Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) notes,
however, that one of the primary obstacles to completing an exit-data
collection program is the additional infrastructure requirements at land
border crossings. 84 DHS estimates that implementing such a system
would cost approximately $3 billion, 85 but one policy group has estimated that the cost would be somewhere between $3.1 billion and
$6.4 billion. 86 Furthermore, the implementation plans under consideration by DHS would require a collection protocol that would mirror
US-VISIT entry procedures. 87 U.S. border officials would need to
review the travel documents for each exiting traveler and compare that
information to the traveler’s biometric identity. 88 Traffic congestion in
exit lanes would increase dramatically because of the need for each
vehicle to stop for processing—an outcome DHS officials view as
unacceptable. 89 In some cases, an exit system that mirrors US-VISIT
entry procedures would be unfeasible, specifically at urban border
crossings where land constraints exist. 90 While DHS has tested interim procedures for tracking non-biometric exit-data, it estimated that
the technological advancements necessary for a feasible border-exit
implementation would not be available for another five to ten years. 91

Philadelphia, San Francisco, Seattle-Tacoma, and San Juan. The seaport kiosk installations include Miami, Long Beach, and San Pedro. ORTIZ, supra note 27, at 13.
83
Id.
84
See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-248, BORDER
SECURITY: US-VISIT FACES STRATEGIC, OPERATIONAL, AND TECHNOLOGICAL
CHALLENGES AT LAND PORTS OF ENTRY 7 (2006).
85
Id.
86
NGUYEN & MCNEILL, supra note 6, at 4.
87
See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-248, BORDER
SECURITY: US-VISIT FACES STRATEGIC, OPERATIONAL, AND TECHNOLOGICAL
CHALLENGES AT LAND PORTS OF ENTRY 7 (2006).
88
See id. (referencing existing entry procedures, which utilize biometric
data, as an instructive framework for exit-system proposals).
89
Id.
90
For example, the border crossing at San Ysidro, California operates 24
staffed entry lanes, but only six unmanned exit lanes. Implementing a mirror biometric exit-data collection protocol would require the construction of an additional 18
exit lanes to manage the same level of traffic. Furthermore, all exit lanes would need
to be staffed and equipped with fixed inspection facilities and biometric scanners
accordingly. Id. at 39-40.
91
Id. at 7. See discussion infra Part II for possible solutions for collecting
biometric exit-data.
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C. Purposes of the US-VISIT program
US-VISIT’s slogan, “Keeping America’s Doors Open and Our
Nation Secure,” 92 emphasizes the multi-faceted purpose of the program. DHS has identified four principal goals for implementing a
biometric tracking system for foreign visitors: (1) enhancing the security of U.S. citizens and visitors; (2) expediting legitimate travel and
trade; (3) ensuring the integrity of the U.S. immigration system; and
(4) safeguarding the personal privacy of visitors to the United States. 93
1. Enhancing Security for U.S. Citizens and Visitors
While immigration policies and procedures cannot prevent terrorist acts, “they are key ingredients of the effort to combat terrorism”
and related U.S. national security interests. 94 DHS has recently stated
that” [b]iometrics—unique physical characteristics, such as fingerprints, that can be used for automated recognition—form the foundation of US-VISIT’s identification services because they are reliable,
convenient and virtually impossible to forge.”95 Travelers can easily
change names and dates of birth on travel documentation, but biometrics are unique for each individual. 96 Prior to US-VISIT, immigration
officials relied primarily upon paper-based documents that were susceptible to fraud or alteration. 97 Incorporating biometric data into the
immigration process significantly increases the ability to detect fraudulent and altered travel documents. 98 Biometric data also allows officials to verify the identity of individuals applying for visas with a

92
U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., NEW BIOMETRIC TECHNOLOGY IMPROVES
SECURITY AND FACILITATES U.S. ENTRY PROCESS FOR INTERNATIONAL TRAVELERS
(2009), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/usvisit/usvisit_edu_10finger
print_consumer_friendly_content_1400_words.pdf [hereinafter NEW BIOMETRIC
TECHNOLOGY IMPROVES SECURITY].
93
BIOMETRICS AND YOU, supra note 2, at 1.
94
Martin, supra note 18, at 329.
95
ENHANCING SECURITY THROUGH BIOMETRIC IDENTIFICATION, supra note 4,
at 3.
96
NEW BIOMETRIC TECHNOLOGY IMPROVES SECURITY, supra note 92, at 2
(“The United States collects biometrics because unlike names and dates of birth,
which can be changed, biometrics are unique and almost impossible to forge.”).
97
ENHANCING SECURITY THROUGH BIOMETRIC IDENTIFICATION, supra note 4,
at 2.
98
Id. To illustrate this point, DHS provides anecdotal “success stories”
where biometric data collection helped uncover fraudulent documents, which may not
have been revealed prior to US-VISIT’s implementation. Id.
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greater veracity, where before they needed to rely primarily on biographic background information.99
The ability to digitize biometric data also allows for increased cooperation between agencies and countries and offers inter-agency access to vital information100 because US-VISIT provides a single
source of biometric data for “dangerous people.” 101 Examples of collaboration through US-VISIT are numerous. The Department of State
uses US-VISIT to gather the identities of visa applicants at consulates
and embassies. 102 CBP collects biometric data at United States points
of entry and uses that information to confirm the identity of travelers
attempting to enter the United States. 103 CBP also uses US-VISIT to
track the identities of those illegal immigrants apprehended at the border. 104 Citizenship & Immigration Services uses US-VISIT to verify
the identity of those applying for immigration benefits like asylum
and refugee status. 105 Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”)
uses US-VISIT’s database to track individuals who have overstayed
the time limit on their visas. 106 The U.S. Coast Guard (“USCG”) identifies individuals apprehended during illegal migrant interdiction missions with US-VISIT. 107 The Department of Defense and the Intelligence Community are able to identify terror suspects by crossreferencing biometric information collected at known terrorist safehouses or training camps with information in the US-VISIT database. 108 The Department of Justice, through the FBI, uses US-VISIT
to assist state and local law enforcement officers during investigations. 109 Indeed, US-VISIT possesses a dedicated Biometric Support
Center that provides forensic analysis and identification assistance for
federal, state, and local agency investigations twenty-four hours a day,
seven days a week. 110 US-VISIT allows for unprecedented collabora-

99

Id. (noting that the near-impossibility of forging biometric data increases
its veracity).
100
Id. (explaining that after US-VISIT there is “[b]etter coordination with
other agencies; [because there is] a single source for biometrics-based information on
dangerous people” and on a global scale, “[c]ountries are adopting similar standards
to stop criminals, immigration violators and known or suspected terrorists”).
101
Id.
102
Id. at 4.
103
Id.
104
Id.
105
Id.
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Id.
107
Id.
108
Id.
109
Id.
110
Id.
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tion by centralizing the location of the data collected by each of these
individual agencies. 111
Although the program is relatively new, DHS already has advertised success stories demonstrating US-VISIT’s ability to increase
security. For example, when a foreign national arrived at New York’s
John F. Kennedy International Airport, all of his immigration and visa
documentation appeared to be in order.112 On paper, he had no history
of criminal or immigration violations. When U.S. immigration officials scanned the man’s fingerprints, however, they discovered that
the visa documentation was for the man’s twin brother. The man at
the airport had previously been arrested for illegally taking photographs of a U.S. military base and thus, CBP officials refused entry. 113
In another case, a foreign national applied for U.S. asylum using
an alias and an incorrect date of birth to disguise his identity. 114 After
immigration officials referenced his fingerprints with the US-VISIT
database, “his biometrics revealed an extensive criminal record, including charges for rape, assault, and an outstanding warrant for kidnapping.” 115 Immigration officials alerted law enforcement, who arrested the man. 116
In an example of international cooperation, a man was detained in
the United Kingdom after attempting to apply for asylum illegally. 117
When the man applied for asylum, the United Kingdom crossreferenced his fingerprints with the US-VISIT database, and discovered that the man had previously traveled to the United States under a
false name, and was attempting to hide his true identity in his asylum
application. The United Kingdom learned that the man was wanted on
rape charges in Australia and promptly deported him to face criminal
proceedings in that country. 118
The most compelling demonstration of US-VISIT effectiveness,
however, may be the USCG’s use of the biometric data technology in
the seas around the Caribbean. 119 During one illegal migrant interdiction mission, the USCG detained ten illegal migrants attempting to
111
Id. Because close allies to the United States are also implementing similar
programs with like standards, immigration officials have access to biometric data
across the globe. This allows for identification of potentially “dangerous people”
through international collaboration. Id.
112
Id. at 2.
113
Id.
114
Id.
115
Id.
116
Id.
117
Id.
118
Id.
119
Id. at 5.
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enter Puerto Rico by sea. After tracking the identities of the individuals through the US-VISIT database, USCG discovered that two of the
individuals had illegally entered the United States on a prior occasion,
and were believed to be part of a human trafficking criminal enterprise. The USCG detained the two and brought them ashore for prosecution. USCG reports that since its implementation of biometric collection procedures in accordance with the US-VISIT program, “prosecutions of repeat offenders have increased dramatically and illegal
migration has dropped by 75 percent in the area where the [USVISIT] technology is being used.” 120
Statistics also suggest that the US-VISIT program appears to be
providing tangible assistance for immigration officials. In Fiscal Year
2007, US-VISIT identified 25,552 individuals applying for visas at
consular offices and another 11,685 individuals at United States ports
of entry who were on biometric watch lists. 121 During that year, USVISIT also provided ICE with the names of 12,000 foreign travelers
who had overstayed their allotted time in the United States, 273 of
whom ICE ultimately detained. 122 Furthermore, US-VISIT flagged
and identified 11,246 individuals who entered the United States and
subsequently committed a crime during their stays. 123 A DHS official
has indicated that at least two of the nineteen terrorist hijackers responsible for the September 11, 2001 attacks may have been stopped
by the US-VISIT program and denied entry to the country. 124 Overall,
since the program’s inception in 2004, over 1,350 individuals with
immigration violations and criminal records have been stopped from
entering the United States.125
2. Promoting Legitimate Travel and Trade
While US-VISIT’s primary purpose is to promote security, DHS
recognizes an equally important objective of promoting the speed and
efficiency of legitimate travel and trade.126 Because biometric data is
120

Id.
Jessica Vaughan, Numbers from US-Visit, CTR. FOR IMMIGRATION STUDIES
(Dec. 24, 2008), http://www.cis.org/vaughan/USVISITNumbers (providing a summary of key figures from the annual report on US-VISIT for FY 2007).
122
Id.
123
Id.
124
See Brazil to Fingerprint US Citizens, BBC NEWS (Dec. 31, 2003, 8:14
AM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/3358627.stm; see also THE 9/11
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 18, at 564 n. 33 (“Two hijackers could have been
denied admission at the port of entry based on violations of immigration rules governing terms of admission.”).
125
Miller, supra note 55, at 208 (footnote omitted).
126
BIOMETRICS AND YOU, supra note 2, at 1.
121
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unique, US-VISIT can facilitate travel for those legitimate travelers
who lose their passports or travel documentation. 127 For instance, Interpol reports indicate that 6.7 million passports have been lost or stolen since 2001, 2.8 million of which were from the United States’
Visa Waiver Program countries. 128 To this point, US-VISIT and its
use of biometric data speeds the re-issuance of travel documentation
for U.S. citizens, promoting efficiency in the event a traveler loses his
or her passport. 129
Officials may also use US-VISIT to facilitate the visa issuance
process. In 2000, more than 10 million foreign citizens applied for
visas to enter the United States. 130 Prior to US-VISIT, critics claimed
that visa officers were too cautious and denied visas to too many applicants with legitimate travel reasons.131 State department officials
had previously reviewed visa applications using NAILS, a namebased database, 132 but this proved problematic because travelers using
a false name and fraudulent travel documentation could easily evade
the system. 133 Ultimately, tracking names with fingerprints and passports with biometric identifiers significantly reduced the need for extensive background checks for most visa applications. 134
US-VISIT is also taking proactive steps to reduce the burden it
places on travelers entering the United States. In November of 2007,
DHS began upgrading most fingerprint scanners used at United States
points of entry from two-finger technology to ten-finger technology. 135 The upgrades were complete by December of 2008 and took
place at all major points of entry. 136 Initially, some critics worried that
scanning more fingers would increase wait times and immigration
127
See NEW BIOMETRIC TECHNOLOGY IMPROVES SECURITY, supra note 92, at 2
(“By using biometrics to establish and verify travelers’ identities, we are making
international travel more convenient, predictable and secure for legitimate visitors,
but difficult, unpredictable and intimidating for criminals, immigration violators and
those who want to do harm to the United States.”).
128
Id.
129
Id.
130
Martin, supra note 18, at 331.
131
Id.
132
Id. at 332.
133
Id. See also discussion supra Part I.A.
134
Miller, supra note 55, at 207.
135
U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., FACT SHEET: UPGRADE TO 10-FINGERPRINT
COLLECTION
1
(2009),
available
athttp://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/usvisit/usvisit_edu_10fingerprint_collection_fact_sheet.pdf [hereinafter UPGRADE TO 10-FINGERPRINT
COLLECTION].
136
Id. (noting that most foreign visitors entering the United States experience
this new scanning technology).
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lines, but DHS officials note that the new scanners actually decrease
the time it takes to identify an individual.137 In fact, border checks are
now estimated to take less than one minute to complete. 138 This increase in efficiency is due to the fact that the additional fingerprints
provide more data to reference with the US-VISIT biometric database,
allowing the system to find a match faster and with greater accuracy. 139 This increase in accuracy should also substantially decrease the
number of legitimate travelers who are mistakenly identified and taken for questioning, allowing for a more efficient immigration process. 140 GAO recently reported that immigration officers at every U.S.
point of entry surveyed agreed that US-VISIT improved their ability
to identify and process travelers quickly. 141
To ensure that immigration procedures are easy and predictable
for legitimate travelers, DHS has also engaged in an aggressive media
campaign to educate visitors about the new biometric collection procedures. 142 DHS has made presentations at over 500 events in 26
countries around the world, created educational materials in 15 languages, and has worked with “government and private sector partners
to ensure widespread reach to travelers around the world.” 143 DHS
notes that these efforts are designed to improve efficiency in travel
and avoid confusion that may arise for foreign travelers. 144
3. Ensuring the Integrity of the U.S. Immigration System
Prior to US-VISIT, the United States had difficulty regulating the
free circulation of dangerous people after they entered the country. 145
For example, at least sixteen of the September 11th hijackers entered
the United States legally with valid visas, 146 but immigration officials
did not track their activities once the terrorists entered the country. 147
137

NEW BIOMETRIC TECHNOLOGY IMPROVES SECURITY, supra note 92, at 1.
Miller, supra note 55, at 207.
139
NEW BIOMETRIC TECHNOLOGY IMPROVES SECURITY, supra note 92, at 1.
140
Id.
141
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-248, BORDER SECURITY:
US-VISIT FACES STRATEGIC, OPERATIONAL, AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHALLENGES AT
LAND PORTS OF ENTRY 5 (2006).
142
See, e.g., NEW BIOMETRIC TECHNOLOGY IMPROVES SECURITY, supra note
92, at 1 (stating that “US-VISIT understands the critical role that communications
play in avoiding confusion and clarifying misperception” regarding the collection of
biometric data).
143
Id.
144
See id.
145
See Martin, supra note 18, at 329-31.
146
Id. at 331.
147
Id. at 330 (“The U.S. does not track the movement of foreigners once they
have entered.”).
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Had immigration officials monitored the hijackers’ activities subsequent to their entry into the United States, officials would have discovered that some were in violation of the terms of their visas. For
instance, one hijacker was granted entry on a student visa, but never
showed up to the University to which he was admitted. 148 Beyond the
events of 9/11, problems with the improper entry of foreigners into the
United States are widespread. In 2000, there were an estimated 8.5
million unauthorized foreigners in the United States.149 While most do
not pose a security threat, this pervasive nature of illegal immigration
hampers officials’ efforts to identify true security threats. 150 Current
mechanisms used by immigration officials to identify unauthorized
entry or violations of visa terms are unable to correct the problem and
thus, the need for a better system is apparent.
Generally, visitors who violate their visa’s approved length of
stay in the United States can be tracked using the exit-data collected
from the Form I-94 that is returned to immigration officials when
leaving the country. 151 Unfortunately, compliance with collection protocols is spotty and many visitors exiting the United States through
land border-crossings do not return their forms. 152 This limits the effectiveness of the present tracking system that DHS can use to identify visa violators. Furthermore, I-94 forms are not very effective at
tracking the departures of specific individuals because they are completed by hand, which means that U.S. immigration officials must
enter the data into a computer manually, slowing the identification of
violators. 153 As noted by a senior immigration official in testimony
given before the Senate Committee on Finance, the use of biometric
data in entry-exit tracking systems would allow immigration officials
to determine instantly whether a particular alien has overstayed his or
her visa, 154 which would be a considerable improvement over the current system.

148

Id.
Id. at 337.
150
Id. at 336-37 (noting, for example, that “[a]lthough...unauthorized workers
do not themselves pose a security threat, tolerance of their entry and presence in the
country hampers efforts to close the back door of illegal migration—a backdoor that
terrorists can too easily exploit for their own purposes”).
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Id. at 333.
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Id.
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Id.
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See U.S. Borders: Safe or Sieve?: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Fin.
108th Cong. 120 (2003) (statement of Johnny N. Williams, Exec. Assoc. Comm’r for
Field Operations, U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Serv.); see also Martin, supra
note 18, at 334.
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4. Safeguarding Personal Privacy of Visitors
Because the collection of biometric data involves highly personal
information unique to an individual, there is the obvious concern that
if not regulated, this information could be used or shared in an improper way. DHS maintains that it only uses the biometric data for the
purposes for which it was collected, and as authorized or mandated by
law. 155 To ensure that this goal is met, the US-VISIT program has
created an officer position responsible for maintaining privacy and
confidentiality. 156 Further, in the event that a traveler believes that the
information in US-VISIT’s database is incorrect, DHS provides multiple avenues for correcting the mistake. 157 For example, foreign travelers may make inquiries into their personal data or immigrationrelated screening issues through the Traveler Redress Inquiry Program
(“TRIP”). 158 Individuals can initiate inquiries through an interactive
website, by sending an email to US-VISIT’s Privacy Officer, or by
mailing a hard-copy of all travel documentation to US-VISIT’s office
at DHS headquarters in Washington, D.C. 159
There have been some recent concerns, however, about the integrity of the privacy safeguards in place. In one such complaint filed
under the Freedom of Information Act, a journalist sought information
from CBP regarding the unexpected malfunction of US-VISIT computers on August 18, 2005. 160 According to a spokesperson for the
DHS, a system shutdown occurred due to a virus that impacted computer systems in New York, San Francisco, Miami, Los Angeles,
Houston, Dallas, and Laredo, Texas. 161 DHS later reported that USVISIT computers occasionally malfunction.162
US-VISIT’s privacy policy has also been subject to criticism from
foreign nationals. In another Freedom of Information Act complaint
against DHS, a member of the European Union’s parliament was con155

See ENHANCING SECURITY THROUGH BIOMETRIC IDENTIFICATION, supra
note 4, at 6 (explaining the US-VISIT’s privacy policy).
156
NEW BIOMETRIC TECHNOLOGY IMPROVES SECURITY, supra note 92, at 3
(noting that “US-VISIT has a dedicated privacy officer, who is responsible not only
for ensuring compliance with privacy laws and procedures, but also for creating a
culture within the program where privacy is inherently valued, treated as a fundamental right and obligation, and fully considered in US-VISIT’s planning and development processes”).
157
Id. at 3-4.
158
Id. at 3.
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Id. at 3-4.
160
Poulsen v. U.S. Customs & Border Prot., No. C 06-1743 SI, 2006 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 73670, at *1-2 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 2006).
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Id. at *2.
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Id.
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cerned with a notice published by DHS stating that it had instituted a
program called the Automated Targeting System. 163 This was a method of data-mining used by various databases—including US-VISIT—
to create risk assessments for travelers entering the United States. 164
The parliament member alleged that this treatment of passenger data
was a violation of European Union citizens’ “fundamental rights.” 165
These allegations echoed domestic statements made by the American
Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”), claiming that the U.S. terror watch
lists that feed these systems are “bloated and full of inaccuracy” due
to the ACLU’s inability to ascertain the criteria for adding or removing an individual from these lists. 166 Going forward, DHS hopes to
resolve these issues through its latest privacy initiatives, including its
TRIP grievance process. 167

II. BIOMETRIC EXIT-DATA COLLECTION
OPPORTUNITIES ARE AVAILABLE TO IMPROVE
THE US-VISIT SECURITY INITIATIVE’S SUCCESS
As previously discussed, US-VISIT’s true potential lies in obtaining biometric data from those exiting the country. While operational
realities and resource restrictions limit the ability of U.S. immigration
officials to obtain this exit-data in the same manner as when foreigners enter the country, creative approaches to data collection procedures could allow for the collection of this information. First, sharing
border-crossing infrastructure and staffing with Canada could dramatically improve US-VISIT’s exit-data collection capabilities. Second,
there are opportunities for foreign visitors’ biometric data to be collected upon entry to Canada in accordance with DHS’s goal of pushing immigration procedures away from the United States’ physical
border. Finally, US-VISIT could incorporate new forms of border
enforcement identification technologies, such as RFID tagging and
iris recognition software.
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In ‘t Veld v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 589 F. Supp. 2d 16, 18 (D.D.C.
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Jun Hongo, Will Entry Checks Cross the Line?, THE JAPAN TIMES (Nov. 8,
2007),http://search.japantimes.co.jp/print/nn20071108f1.html (describing statements
of Barry Steinhardt, director of the ACLU’s Program on Technology and Liberty).
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See US-VISIT Redress Process (DHS TRIP), U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND
SEC., http://www.dhs.gov/files/programs/gc_1180020923182.shtm#2 (last visited
Mar. 6, 2011) (providing background information on the TRIP process).
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A. Utilizing Canadian Border Infrastructure for Exit-Data Collection
Executing a biometric exit-data collection procedure presents the
most pressing need for US-VISIT’s success. 168 While a complete infrastructure initiative at all border exits still remains unfeasible due to
space constraints and considerable cost, 169 US-VISIT officials could
begin collecting data through immigration procedures already in place
in Canada. There are already many examples of successful security
cooperation between Canada and the United States.170 Thus, combining the infrastructure and staffing requirements at shared immigration
checkpoints would allow for collection of biometric exit-data in the
near future.
Joint Canada-U.S. immigration activities are already in use at Canadian airports and can provide a model for border crossings. To facilitate this relationship, the Canadian government passed the Preclearance Act in 1999 171 and has authorized U.S. immigration officials to
work at Canadian points of departure to the United States, inspecting
foreign visitors who are bound for the United States. 172 U.S. customs
officials are currently posted in many of Canada’s airports and conduct pre-inspections for travelers flying to the United States.173 Further, “[i]f a person flies into the United States from Japan via Vancouver or Toronto, he or she will be greeted by [a] U.S. Customs and
Border Protection inspector,” upon arrival in Canada.174
Through future cooperation with Canadian immigration officials,
CBP could implement biometric data collection kiosks at these Cana168

See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-248, BORDER
SECURITY: US-VISIT FACES STRATEGIC, OPERATIONAL, AND TECHNOLOGICAL
CHALLENGES AT LAND PORTS OF ENTRY 7 (2006).
169
See id.
170
The United States and Canada are both participants in the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization, and collaborated on the North American Air Defense system
(commonly referred to as “NORAD”). Canada has also been incorporated into the
United States’ Strategic Defense Initiative, providing ballistic missile defense. The
two countries have created an export perimeter control, requiring sensitive technologies to remain within their common borders. Several law enforcement joint task forces have also been established including Project North Star, Integrated Border Enforcement Teams, and Integrated National Security Enforcement Teams. See, e.g.
John Noble, Fortress America or Fortress North America?, 11 LAW & BUS. REV.
AM.461, 467-71 (2005).
171
Preclearance Act, S.C. 1999, c. 20 (Can.).
172
See Rey Koslowski, Smart Borders, Virtual Borders or No Borders:
Homeland Security Choices for the United States and Canada, 11 LAW & BUS. REV.
AM. 527, 531 (2005) (discussing how Canada has allowed U.S. immigration inspectors access to Canadian ports of entry to inspect U.S.-bound passengers since 1894).
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dian points of entry for those travelers continuing on to the United
States. This approach would have two advantages. First, it would
speed immigration processing times at the United States point of entry
because biometric data for travelers connecting through Canada would
already have been taken. Second, it would prevent travelers that the
United States considers “dangerous people” from boarding a commercial airliner bound for the United States, as well as prevent them from
disembarking on U.S. soil.
Cooperation at border crossings, however, has seen political opposition stemming from the United States’ historical use of biometric
identification technology. In 1999, U.S. immigration officials began
reviewing commercial paperwork on the Canadian side of the Peace
Bridge border crossing in Buffalo-Fort Erie for trucks bound for the
United States. 175 Customs officials intended to reduce congestion
“caused by lack of advance document preparation.” 176 In December
2004, the United States and Canada announced an expanded Shared
Border Management (“SBM”) pilot project at the Peace Bridge. 177 As
part of the program, DHS had planned to conduct all primary and secondary border operations on the Canadian side of the border. 178 Conducting inspections on the Canadian side made was advantageous
because space to expand immigration and customs operations is greater on the Canadian side. 179 A local neighborhood and a historic park
constrain development on the U.S. side.180
With the existing infrastructure present at border crossings, commentators have suggested that collecting biometric exit-data at Canadian points of entry represents the only feasible option.181 Because
travelers exiting the United States must stop at the Canadian border to
gain entry to Canada, collecting biometric exit-data in Canada would
eliminate the need to build new infrastructure on the United States’
175

ABA Immigration and Nationality Comm., supra note 28, at 211.
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See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-1038R, SHARED
BORDER MANAGEMENT 2 (2008), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0810
38r.pdf.
178
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staffing them with CBP officers to conduct primary exit inspections, Canadian Border
Services Agency officers could simultaneously conduct their entry inspections together with U.S. exit inspections, so-called ‘reverse inspections.’”).
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CHRISTOPHER SANDS, THE BROOKINGS INST., TOWARD A NEW FRONTIER:
IMPROVING THE U.S.-CANADIAN BORDER 17 (2009).
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See, e.g., Koslowski, supra note 172, at 540 (noting that inspections on the
Canadian side of the border “may be the best, if not the only, secure option short of
building and staffing an exit infrastructure comparable to the existing entry infrastructure”).
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side of the border and would ultimately reduce more traffic and congestion outbound from the United States. Canadian immigration officials at many land borders already collect I-94 forms from travelers
departing from the United States and return them to U.S. immigration
officials for processing; 182 thus, the foundation for cooperation between the two countries’ immigration officials is already established.
In April 2007, however, both Canada and the United States withdrew from negotiations necessary to finalize the SBM program. 183 The
two countries could not agree on fundamental concerns regarding
arrest authority and the right of U.S. officers to fingerprint travelers
who come to the bridge, but decide not to cross.184 While U.S. Congressional leaders continue to call upon President Obama to renew
negotiations with Canadian counterparts,185 commentators do not see
a resolution to this impasse in the near future.186
Specifically, Canadian negotiators argued that collecting biometric data in Canadian territory would violate Canada’s Charter of
Rights and Freedoms (“Charter”).187 Section 15(1) of the Charter provides that: “[e]very individual is equal before and under the law and
has the right to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in particular, without discrimination based on
race, national or ethnic origin, color, religion, sex, age or mental or
physical disability.” 188 Commentators and Canadian negotiators analogized their fears that the SBM program would violate the Charter
with those of human rights groups that criticized NSEERS. 189 These
182

Id. at 538.
Jason Ackleson, From “Thin” to “Thick” (and Back Again?): The Politics
and Policies of the Contemporary US-Canada Border, 39 AM. REV. OF CAN. STUD.
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President Obama to revisit the Shared Border Management negotiations during a trip
to Canada).
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administration, this appears unlikely”; indeed, as the general manager of the Peace
Bridge Authority remarked, “[i]t is highly improbable” that anyone in Washington
will advocate for this program) (footnote omitted).
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groups argued that NSEERS’s implementation in Canadian airports
under the Preclearance Act violated the Charter because it targeted
travelers from primarily Muslim and Arabic countries. 190
Canada intended the Preclearance Act to “avoid the extraterritorial application of US laws at these preclearance sites” and provided all travelers the full protections of Canadian law and the Charter. 191 If SBM is to maintain similar protections, the United States
must guarantee that similar targeting does not occur in the future. This
objective is met under the current US-VISIT program because its
scope now includes all non-U.S. citizen travelers, regardless of country. 192 Thus, unlike under the NSEERS protocol, there is neither a
need nor a possibility for U.S. or Canadian customs officials to profile
travelers based upon their affiliation with any religion or ethnic group.
With the ability to identify the biometric identity of all travelers, concerns over Charter violations could be mitigated. US-VISIT’s breadth
and demonstrated effectiveness could lead to productive SBM negotiations in the future, providing a feasible avenue for the collection of
biometric exit-data.
B. Extending the Reach of U.S. Border Protection by Creating a
Common Biometric Data Collection Perimeter
Called the “longest, unprotected border,” the Canada-U.S. border
stretches 5,525 miles and has 84 land border crossings. 193 In 2000,
figures indicated that approximately 130 million people cross the
Canada-U.S. border each year and goods in excess of $1.5 billion
cross the border each day. 194 Canada exports about 82 percent of its
goods to the United States, and the United States sends roughly 19
percent of its goods to Canada. 195 Additionally, Canada is the biggest
export market for thirty-nine U.S. states. 196

a Schengen-Type System will Best Serve the Security Interests of the United States
and Canada, 2004 SYRACUSE SCI. & TECH. L. REP. 2, 7-15 (2004) (discussing
NSEERS’s controversial targeting of specific ethnicities, and its impact on the implementation of joint border enforcement policies, noting that “[i]t is this system the
National Security Entry-Exit Registration System that presented the first real disagreement between Canadian and American governments and challenge to the cooperation which could ensure a safer North America”).
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Many Canadian officials and northern U.S. border states opposed
the implementation of US-VISIT because they were concerned about
the program’s potential impact on trade and tourism. 197 Policies that
increase border-crossing times would be severely detrimental to
commercial interests of both countries.198 For instance, many corporations rely upon Just-In-Time (“JIT”) deliveries from across the border
and delays could result in lost revenue and manufacturing shutdowns. 199 Unsurprisingly, both nations recognize that overzealous
border restrictions could devastate their respective economies, 200 and
that implementing US-VISIT exit-data collection procedures at the
land border crossings would have at least a noticeable impact on the
trans-border flow. 201 GAO has also noted that US-VISIT exitcapabilities cannot be implemented at border crossings without “incurring a major impact” on those facilities.202
National security concerns further complicate the problem because, as the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (“CSIS”) notes,
“[w]ith the possible exception of the United States, there are more
international terrorist organizations active in Canada than anywhere in
the world.” 203 According to CSIS, this is due to Canada’s proximity to
the United States—the principal target of international terrorist organizations—and Canada’s accommodating immigration policies.204 Because of the prevalence of terrorist organizations in both the United
States and Canada, an agreement over how to handle biometric data
collection necessarily implicates important political policies.
While some commentators have underscored this tension between
national security concerns and economic development, others have
argued that U.S. national security depends upon maintaining open
economic corridors; specifically, maintaining the economic relation197

Martin, supra note 18, at 333.
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(discussing the volume of commercial traffic between the United States and Canada,
and noting it “precludes policies that would result in measurably longer crossing
times”).
199
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See Martin, supra note 18, at 333 (indicating that if each person crossing
the border had to be checked on entry and exit it would obviously “curtail” some
trade and tourism).
202
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-248, BORDER SECURITY:
US-VISIT FACES STRATEGIC, OPERATIONAL, AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHALLENGES AT
LAND PORTS OF ENTRY 7 (2006).
203
ABA Immigration and Nationality Comm., supra note 28, at 203 (citing
CAN. SEC. INTELLIGENCE SERV., GOV’T OF CANADA, OPERATIONAL PROGRAMS:
COUNTER-TERRORISM (revised Aug. 9, 2002)).
204
Id.
198

96

JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & THE INTERNET [Vol. 2:2

ship it has with Canada. 205 Accordingly, as one commentator noted:
“U.S. prosperity—and much of its power—relies on its ready access
to North American and global networks of transport, energy, information, finance and labor. It is self-defeating for the United States to
embrace security measures that end up isolating it from those networks.” 206 Indeed, terrorists have repeatedly attacked United States
economic targets in an attempt to undermine its security. 207 Thus,
maintaining a permeable border with Canada may have corresponding
benefits for the security interests of the United States.208
Taking into consideration the importance of border fluidity, the
United States adopts the view that its borders must represent its last
line of defense in that security “efforts must begin beyond U.S. territorial limits.” 209 Thus, many national security policy proposals are
based upon an attempt to “push U.S. borders out.” 210 One policy proposal that has recently gained momentum involves the implementation
of a “North American Perimeter” (“Perimeter”).211 Under a Perimeter
regime, “internal border controls are lifted as a common external border is established.” 212 Advocates for the policy argue that:
[h]armonizing US and Canadian immigration and asylum policies would make it harder to organize attacks on the U.S.
from Canada, and vice versa. If the two countries agreed on
the criteria and used the same procedures for admitting foreign nationals, they could leave the Canada-U.S. border largely unguarded, benefiting trade and tourism. 213
The European Union has implemented a similar system, where 13
member nations participate in the collection of entry and exit-data, but
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permit the free movement of people between the countries.214 Executed by the Schengen Agreement, members share access to a collective
integrated border security database and present a common border
check for foreign travelers.215 The fluidity of goods and people across
European borders has been associated with notable economic growth
in the region. 216
Critics of the proposal argue that Perimeter would usurp Canada’s
ability to set its own immigration policies, requiring it to harmonize
its security and immigration policies with that of the United States. 217
From a national security standpoint, critics point out that there are
noticeable differences between Canadian and U.S. immigration policies that make coordination difficult. Indeed, several potential terrorists have been intercepted at the Canada-U.S. border, 218 which has led
to the perception that Canada’s immigration policies are more lenient
than those of the United States. 219
Adopting biometric data collection practices in Canada, however,
would not necessitate a full implementation of a Perimeter; the parties
could reach this result with a narrow agreement. A shared biometric
data collection system could be set up independently and would not
require the harmonization of visa and asylum policies, allaying Canadian concerns of losing control over its immigration policies. Additionally, a physical barrier between the United States and Canada
would still exist for those concerned about opening the border to
completely unrestricted travel.
Under this policy initiative, the need to confirm a traveler’s identity at the Canada-U.S. border would be eliminated. Travelers who enter the United States over the Canada-U.S. border would have already
had their identity confirmed upon entering Canada. Determining the
true identity of travelling Canadians would also not be necessary because under the current US-VISIT regime, Canadians are exempt from
biometric data collection protocols. 220 Thus, biometric data collection
214
Id. (“[The European Union’s Schengen Agreement] currently permits free
movement among 13 member nations, with entry and exit controls for all done by
participating countries, so that a flight from Madrid to Paris is treated as an internal
flight.”).
215
Id.
216
Id.; see also Miller, supra note 55, at 187-88 (discussing the relationship
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217
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220
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at Canada-U.S. border checkpoints would not be necessary, facilitating the flow of legitimate travel. Such a program would allow the
United States to uphold the objectives set forth by US-VISIT, but continue to provide a relatively open border with Canada. Similar to the
proposed SBM approach, US-VISIT’s scope includes all foreign travelers, not just those from targeted countries. Thus, Canadian concerns
over potential Charter violations through profiling could be eliminated.
C. Implementing Alternative Exit-Data Collection Technologies
1. RFID Tagging in I-94 Forms
While building exit-data collection facilities identical to those
found upon points of entry would be cost-prohibitive, several emerging identification technologies exist that could be used to similar effect. For example, Radio Frequency Identification (“RFID”) technology has been tested at several land border crossings since 2006. 221
RFID technology comprises a microchip with an antenna that transmits a unique signal wirelessly to a receiver that reads the signal.222
Beyond the border security context, other industries have utilized
RFID technology as part of their business strategy. For instance, credit
card companies have begun to embed RFID chips in their cards and
have marketed this “PayPass” technology as an ability for consumers
to swipe cards wirelessly. 223 Retailers are also using RFID chips to
track goods for supply-chain management purposes. 224
Chips embedded in I-94 forms can transmit data to radio receivers
located at border exit points. 225 RFID chips can transmit to receivers
20 feet away, 226 allowing officials to capture the information instantaneously when travelers cross the border without requiring automobile
or pedestrian traffic to stop at the border. This technology would allow U.S. border officials to track electronically those travelers carry221
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ing their I-94 Forms when leaving the United States.227 Such an implementation would be similar to the electronic highway toll EZ-Pass
system, where RFID transmitters track individual vehicles as they
pass through tolls without stopping. 228
However, performance and reliability problems suggest that this
approach is not a feasible long-term solution. Furthermore, the data
embedded in the forms is not biometric and does not fulfill DHS’s
mandate to implement a biometric entry-exit tracking system. 229 Indeed, the tracking system would not be able to track the exit of those
individuals who do not carry their I-94 forms when leaving the country or those individuals who carry another’s I-94 form for the purpose
of deceiving the exit-data collection system. Thus, it is only a temporary solution. 230
2. Iris Recognition Technology
While not currently implemented, DHS has expressed interest in
expanding the biometric data collection procedures to include iris
recognition technology. 231 The technology scans the distinct characteristics of an individual’s iris—the colored ring surrounding the pupil. 232 Other countries have already implemented iris recognition at
immigration checkpoints. For instance, the United Kingdom, Canada,
and the Netherlands each allow frequent travelers to enroll in programs that register the individual’s iris pattern in order to expedite the
immigration process.233 Singapore uses iris recognition to identify and
227
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admit approximately 50,000 workers that travel from Malaysia each
day. 234 Since 2001, the United Arab Emirates (“UAE”) has implemented a mandatory iris scan for every foreigner entering the country. 235
Recent developments in iris scanning technology suggest that it
would be an effective alternative to fingerprint scans. Previous generations of iris recognition technology required individuals to stand
three to ten inches from the scanner.236 However, newer-generation
scanners can recognize the iris of an individual standing fifteen meters
away. 237 Furthermore, the time required to match an iris pattern within
a database is minimal using current technology. UAE officials report
that iris recognition searches typically take about one second.238
With these recent advances in iris scanning technology, the United States could require individuals leaving the country to look at a
scanner by the side of the road. Such an installation would not require
the heavy investment in infrastructure and personnel necessary to
support an exit-data collection procedure mimicking that specified for
entry. Furthermore, travelers would not need to stop and be processed
individually by immigration officials.
Even if US-VISIT officials utilize iris scanning technology at
borders, they should not discontinue the use of all fingerprinting
throughout the program. The iris scan could take place simultaneously
with the fingerprint scan or during the facial photograph when the
foreigner is entering the country. Therefore, US-VISIT would still be
able to harness the power of the FBI’s fingerprint database, but be
able to use iris data to record the exit of those individuals later. Using
multiple forms of biometric identification may be a feasible way to
track both the entry and exit of foreign visitors.

CONCLUSION
While DHS asserts that the US-VISIT program has experienced
reasonable success in meeting its objectives, there still exist areas for
improvement in its biometric collection procedures. The difficulties in
collecting biometric exit-data for travelers leaving the United States
234
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remains one of the primary gaps DHS must resolve in order to comply
with its mandate for a biometric tracking system. Cooperation with
Canadian border officials under the proposed SBM scheme could alleviate the infrastructure requirements at border crossings that prevent
DHS from implementing exit-data collection. In future SBM negotiations, US-VISIT’s expanded scope can resolve Canadian fears of
Charter violations that allegedly occurred under the NSEERS program. Alternatively, the two countries could implement a policy initiative that would resemble a common biometric identification perimeter. Such a program would promote reduced transaction costs for
businesses at border crossings, while maintaining the security objectives set forth by US-VISIT. If Canada and the United States are unwilling to collaborate, US-VISIT could deploy alternative biometric
collection technologies such as iris recognition, which may make the
collection of exit-data information more feasible.
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